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Abstract 
In this thesis the ways in which power is shaped in the Arctic among the ‘Arctic five’ states are 
analyzed. It is argued that the Arctic is a multipolar region, in which Russia is the most dominant 
and other actors adopt strategies towards Russia such as soft balancing, bandwagoning, and 
appeasement. The thesis shows that traditional conceptions of power do not apply unequivocally 
to the Arctic region, because it is hard to control effectively due to its unique geographical 
composition. 
Power in the Arctic is based on the recognition of sovereign rights over an area, which will give 
states economic opportunities (control over waterways and resources) in the future due to 
melting ice. The ideal of permanence underlying modern sovereignty is absent in the changing 
Arctic, and sovereign rights for exploitation of an area do not give states actual sovereignty. 
Sovereignty disputes are therefore often unclear and create interesting power dynamics. They are 
resolved through institutional procedures based on international law and political geography, yet 
states have opportunities for negotiation and can adopt their own viewpoints on sovereignty 
based on what suits the national interest. Thus the Arctic provides a unique example of 
‘structural power’ and the interaction between structure and agency. 
Due to the ever-changing nature of the Arctic, states’ interests are more future-oriented than 
elsewhere. The thesis concludes that while security and sovereignty have become more 
important in the Arctic in recent years, there is no ‘security dilemma’ because capacity building 
does not directly threaten other states, and military conflict does not lead to gains and is highly 
unlikely. Security issues are rather more specific and less concerned with warfare, and more with 
the environment and emergencies. The difficulty of operating in the Arctic environment compels 
states to cooperate through international institutions, but the ‘Arctic five’ do this to further their 
national interests. The interdependence of the Arctic with the system-level is traced, and it is 
found that states are limited in their options in the Arctic due to mutual commitments on a global 
scale and possible precedent effects of agreements in the Arctic. 
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The Arctic Ocean is a region that is currently undergoing drastic environmental change due to 
global warming, leading to rapidly melting ice and a changed composition of the region. The 
newly-shaped situation will pose severe challenges to the region with respect to environmental 
security and the settlement of disputes between states, because parts of the Arctic have 
undetermined sovereign status. This brings the powerful states that are involved in the Arctic 
region into a potential confrontation over critical issues, such as military security, energy, 
environmental stability, and economic resources. These issues are directly related to states’ vital 
interests and power capacities and therefore generate a potential for conflict. The manner in 
which these issues will be governed and how states will behave will be crucial to the prospects of 
stability in the region, and this could have far-reaching implications for international diplomacy 
and global political relations as a whole. 
Although there are various disagreements between states with respect to the Arctic, no open 
confrontation or severe diplomatic crisis has yet occurred in the Arctic region, and disputes have 
been managed mostly peacefully and cooperatively
1
. In this thesis, an analysis is made of this 
current, situation between the states involved in the Arctic, examining their relations to each 
other, and their interests, power capacities, and strategies, and explaining the present situation. 
This provides insight into the unique characteristics of the Arctic situation, as well as into 
broader contemporary patterns of diplomatic conflict and cooperation between states. 
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Background 
History 
The Arctic has long been a fragmented territory inhabited by various indigenous peoples and 
used to be largely undisturbed, after explorers from various states had embarked on several failed 
expeditions. During the late 19
th
 century, the region became more and more cartographically 
assessed by explorers. The global process whereby territories were claimed by western states in 
their mutual competitive expansionism also extended to the Arctic during the first decade of the 
20
th
 century. Territorial sovereignty was undecided in the region, since this was often understood 
as a principle inherent in the definition of the nation-state
2
, and the Arctic by and large fell 
outside any established nations. The principles of how sovereignty could be asserted were 
derived from agreements related to other areas of expansionism, such as the agreements made at 
the Berlin conference of 1884-85, which was meant to regulate spoils in the ‘scramble for 
Africa’3. The Arctic was considered to be terra nullius, an empty land which could be claimed 
by whichever state, without regard for native populations. There was a general satisfaction 
internationally with the situation that the Arctic territory was available for all states to exploit as 
they saw fit
4
, and not much thought was given to the formulation of a regime for the Arctic. 
In 1909, after interest in the Arctic had risen, the American explorer Peary was the first to stake a 
claim to the North Pole by planting a US flag there, but then-president Taft simply responded 
that he did ‘not know exactly what to do with it’5. This illustrated that it was unclear how exactly 
states could exert sovereignty in the region. Some parts of the Arctic were still incompletely 
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mapped
6
 and states had historical claims to various regions which they did not effectively 
occupy. It was not determined to what extent a state should occupy a region in the Arctic in order 
to have full claims over it, as the environment made permanent occupation impossible, and 
moving ice did not provide a stable foundation for claims based on geographical markers; hence, 
ice was considered to be legally of a different status from land or sea
7
. 
Countries eventually negotiated various agreements on the sovereign status of regions in the 
Arctic. Already in 1907, Canadian senator Poirier proposed that the Arctic would be divided 
simply along parallel longitudinal lines that converged on the North Pole. This position was also 
officially adopted by the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union in 1926, which 
asserted that it was the only way to divide the Arctic in a peaceful and orderly manner
8
. This 
type of division had several historical precedents. An early example is an 1825 treaty between 
Britain and Russia that divided their land possessions in North America by a line of longitude. 
More notably, the 1867 treaty between Russia and the United States for the sale of Alaska 
defined the border between Alaska and Russia along the line of longitude through the Bering 
Strait, which then proceeded ‘due north, without limitation, into the same frozen ocean’9. 
Of the land areas in the Arctic, most had already been claimed in one way or another by states 
through exploration, conquest and treaties, or a mixture
10
. Russia had taken possession of the 
whole of Arctic Asia and a portion of Arctic Europe, Sweden and Norway had other European 
portions, Denmark controlled Iceland and Greenland, and the American Arctic was divided 
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 Emmerson 2010, 99. 
7
 As Thomas Balch (1910, cited in Emmerson 2010, 102) wrote on strict sovereignty demarcations in the presence 
of floating ice: ‘such possible conception would be too precarious and shifting to and fro to give any one a good 
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8
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9
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between Canada and the United States
11
. Some national borders were established within Arctic 
areas by nearby countries, but this was done with little regard to the inhabiting Inuit and their 
nomadic lifestyle
12
, and generally uncontroversial. The most significant agreement in this period 
was the Spitsbergen Treaty, a diplomatic compromise between fourteen states
13
 which 
determined that the Svalbard island would become sovereign Norwegian territory, but with ‘non-
discriminatory’ use-rights for various economic activities by other parties14. A parallel with the 
present is that the specific use-rights for multiple states within an Arctic region were more 
important than official recognition of sovereignty in a region. Other regions remained the topic 
of sovereignty disputes, such as Greenland. This island had been transferred from Norway to 
Denmark with the 1814 Treaty of Kiel, but then the full extent of the island was not yet known, 
so a dispute arose that was only settled in favour of Denmark by the International Court of 
Justice in 1933
15
; thus, even in this period, sovereignty disputes were largely left outstanding, 
resolved diplomatically, or through institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
During the Cold War, the Arctic was a place of military confrontation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, which had borders close to each other in this region
16
, and which by 1950 
already controlled the entire Arctic coastline themselves or through their allies
17
. The Arctic was 
one of the ‘principal strategic arenas’ of the Cold War18, and the only relevant consideration in 
the region were bi-polar security politics between the two superpowers and the mutual nuclear 
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threat that could be carried out across the region
19
. It was the shortest route between the two 
states and therefore control over the airspace above the Arctic was strategically vital
20
. The 
Soviet Union already started to claim parts of the Arctic by forming agreements with Norway 
and Finland during the Second World War, while the United States collaborated intensively with 
Canada in the region and constructed shared military infrastructure
21
.  
After Gorbachev stated in a famous speech in 1987 that the Arctic ‘is the place where the 
Eurasian, North American, and Asian Pacific regions meet [and] the interests of states…cross’ 
and suggested a cooperative programme with both military and civilian dimensions
22
, 
perceptions of the region changed and the dominant approach became more cooperative; this has 
been called the ‘first Arctic wave’23. The primary intergovernmental organization concerned with 
collaborative governance of the Arctic region is the Arctic Council, founded in 1995 through the 
Ottawa Declaration, with a mandate to include all common issues in the Arctic, which will be 
expanded upon later. 
In the early 2000s, the Arctic experienced a change in its perception as an international region, 
after actors started to realize the geopolitical implications and significance of climate change in 
the Arctic
24; this has been called the ‘second Arctic wave’25. Rather than merely trying to 
mitigate environmental damage, actors now actively had to consider its consequences and saw 
new potential economic opportunities for shipping and resources emerge, and in 2001, Russia 
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became the first state to make a territorial submission to the CLCS
26
. The Arctic was thereby 
reframed in the public and political consciousness from an area of peaceful cooperation to one in 
which geopolitical concerns and security interests dominate
27
. 
With the ‘Ilulissat Declaration’ in 2007, the ‘Arctic five’ states asserted their primacy in the 
Arctic ‘by virtue of their sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in large areas of the 
Arctic Ocean’ and suggested that other states limit their involvement28. 
Developments 
 
The Arctic has been experiencing severe effects of global warming in the region, with 
temperatures rising twice as fast as anywhere else in the world. Ice is melting at unprecedented 
rates and the ocean may even become ice-free in the summer as early as 2013, perhaps for the 
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first time in millions of years
29
. The consequences of this are of worldwide significance, because 
the Arctic ice provides a cooling mechanism for the earth, and its melting exacerbates global 
warming
30
. Moreover, the disruption of ocean circulation patterns as a result of melting Arctic 
ice could lead to natural disasters elsewhere
31
. The causes of melting ice in the Arctic are also 
external, because emissions of black carbon in industrial countries have led to contamination of 
the region
32
 and to increased absorption of sunlight
33
. The Arctic is a unique region in this 
regard, because the region is frozen, yet delicately intertwined with other climactic regions. 
Because the Arctic is encircled by large continental land masses, it is exposed to surges of water 
from different oceans, and the heat in the atmosphere mixes quickly because the mountain ranges 
of Europe, Asia and America foster the mixing of warm and cold fronts. Thus, the Arctic is much 
more sensitive to climate change than the Antarctic, a more isolated polar region
34
. This has led 
to a situation in the Arctic where the management of environmental change and security is 
becoming more and more important for states
35
.  
Economic and geopolitical opportunities have arisen in the Arctic as a result of melting ice. New 
shipping routes are opening up that could be used for transport over shorter distances, notably the 
Northwest and Northeast Passage. The use of these passages could eventually become vital to 
maintain economic competitiveness, and they could transform the geopolitical situation of other 
important transit passages in politically volatile regions, such as the Suez Canal
36
. However, the 
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jurisdiction over these passages is often unclear
37
, and this is thus an avenue of disagreement 
between states, as shall be discussed later. 
Even more significantly, due to the melting ice, large reserves of energy resources may become 
available
38. Oil and gas consortiums have asserted that the Arctic contains the ‘biggest energy 
story of all time’39 and this could carry a great risk of international conflict over the rights over 
these resources. Although resource extraction will not take place on a large scale in ungoverned 
areas of the high seas any time soon because it is too expensive and risky to be economically 
feasible
40
, this calculus could change if oil prices rise drastically or political tensions increase in 
current regions of extraction
41
. 
Security in the region has become much more important, because areas that were previously 
inhospitable or impenetrable can now be exploited and thus have to be controlled and defended 
by states
42
. These developments have increased the strategic interests and involvement by states 
and other actors within the region, and have led to rising tensions. 
Theoretical framework 
Power 
Power has often been defined in classical social science as an element in a relationship that leads 
to a certain ‘probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry 
out his own will despite resistance’43. This can be understood as an actor’s ‘control over 
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outcomes’, but this can only be assessed post hoc, so this is somewhat of a circular definition44. 
An outcome can also be the maintenance of the status quo, if states manage to use their power is 
to prevent change or conflict from arising at all
45
. Since few forcing measures are taking place in 
the Arctic and no forcing attempts to significantly change the fundamentals of the Arctic 
situation have been made by states, it is not possible to extensively assess states’ control over 
outcomes in the Arctic. It is too speculative to analyze what outcomes would occur if open 
military conflict arose in the Arctic, and there are no solid empirical data on this topic. 
States’ power cannot be measured objectively as a quantitative matter. The early classical realist 
Morgenthau
46
 even claimed that power is ‘basically unmeasurable outside qualitative judgment’, 
and the way it should be qualitatively judged is usually left unspecified
47
; likewise, Robert Dahl 
wrote that ‘adding up influence in separate domains to arrive at an overall estimate of influence 
is intractable’48. 
Instead, power is a phenomenon that is relational, dispositional and multidimensional (Guzzini 
2009, 6). Identifying power has much to do with identifiying the definition a state is placed in 
vis-à-vis others (Berenskoetter 2007, 4). It thus depends on the specific relationship in which it 
becomes apparent; in the Arctic, this means that power is only discernable when analyzing the 
relations between states, and not as an objective given. That power is dispositional means that it 
depends on ‘the particular identities and interests of the actors in the interaction’, and thus it 
cannot be seen separately from states’ intentions in the Arctic. The multidimensional nature of 
power means that there is not a single power configuration, but that it can be different per issue 
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dimension; thus, power dynamics during diplomatic negotiations over, say, fishing rights, can be 
entirely different from those concerning territorial sovereignty. Thus, there is no single 
international power structure in the Arctic; rather, it is ‘relation- and situation-specific’49, since 
there is not one dominant issue area in the Arctic.  
Although realists often consider the analysis of ‘hard power’, or to what extent a state can make 
credible threats of military force and thus influence other states through coercive diplomacy, to 
be sufficient to explain international outcomes
50
, this does not apply to the Arctic. The Arctic is 
an oceanic area that is extremely difficult to traverse or occupy due to the presence of ice and 
harsh climate conditions, and thus there are fewer possibilities for military confrontations and 
aggressive seizing of land, and ‘hard power’ thus cannot be exercised absolutely by states as 
sovereigns in Arctic regions. 
Power more broadly constructed can, for states, be derived in various cases (directly or 
indirectly) from military capabilities, economic strength, diplomatic resources, political 
motivation
51
, population size
52
, or administrative and technological capacity and effectiveness
53
, 
among other factors. However, these general capacities do not translate directly into influence in 
the Arctic region. Power in the Arctic is ‘non-fungible’, meaning that power on one dimension 
cannot be easily swapped for power on another
54
. To use an example, since mass public opinion 
is currently not so important to the Arctic, population size and the resulting public opinion 
pressure does not translate into influence in the Arctic. More significantly, states’ general 
military and economic resources do not automatically give them specific capabilities in the 
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 Guzzini 2009, 7. 
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Arctic, which requires entirely different technology to traverse or control. Building icebreaker 
ships is specialistic and requires around five years
55
, thus in the event of conflict, countries could 
not quickly build ships to transfer their ‘general’ wealth and military capability to the Arctic. 
Power will, rather, be defined as the abilities or capabilities for a state of achieving a desired 
outcome (‘effect action’56) in the Arctic. If states have these capabilities, they have leverage in 
negotiations with other states, since they can make the negotiated outcome a reality. These 
negotiations need not be coercive and can involve a subtler form of power, influence (states 
‘winning others over’ rather than ‘winning over others’)57, because other states may willingly go 
along in one state’s proposal which is in its interest. The concrete, material power resources that 
are most relevant in the Arctic are airspace capability, surveillance capability, and maritime 
capability
58
, and these shall be analyzed.  
A specific form of power is ‘structural power’, which has been defined as ‘power  [that] can 
shape and define structures or tacit bargains states are actually embedded in’, whereby ‘these 
structures become a resource of power by framing the rules of the game in favor of the actor’59. 
Since the structure of the institutional arrangements through which sovereignty is determined in 
the Arctic are central to the power outcomes, the way in which states exercise power within and 
with regard to these structures shall be analyzed. 
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Realist theory 
States 
Theories of realism in international relations exist in many forms. The most prominent 
contemporary broad realist approach is ‘neo-realism’ or ‘structural realism’, which deduces from 
structural determinants of the state system, distinguished from classical realism’s derivations of 
human nature
60; ‘realism’ shall be used here to refer to ‘neo-realism’. Neorealist theories all 
share the ‘hard-core assumptions’ that ‘the [international] system is anarchic, the key actors are 
territorial states, their goals are survival, and thus the maximization of power or security, and 
they act rationally to promote those goals’61. Realists view states as unitary actors that can claim 
absolute sovereignty over their territory. According to realism, since states do not know each 
other’s intentions, they face a ‘security dilemma’, where one state’s relative gains in power 
threaten other states and provoke them to increase their own power, potentially leading to an 
arms race
62
. 
Various neo-realist authors disagree on the strategies employed by states. ‘Offensive realists’ 
such as John Mearsheimer argue that since there is always a ‘possibility’ of war due to the 
uncertainty of other states’ intentions, states will aggressively attempt to maximize their relative 
power over other states, looking out for opportunities to expand at the cost of other states
63
. 
Other, earlier neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz (sometimes called ‘defensive realists’), predict 
that states will only maximize their power to achieve their own security and will therefore often 
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 Waltz 1979. 
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 Sheehan 1996, cited in Levy 2004, 31. 
62
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accept the status quo
64
. Stephen Walt has argued that states mostly balance against perceived 
threats
65
. 
Balancing strategies 
Realism predicts that states will form fluctuating alliances and coalitions to achieve a ‘balance of 
power’ between states and prevent the arising of a situation of hegemony by one state, which 
would threaten other states. Preserving a balance is therefore considered necessary for states to 
maintain their independence and ensure their survival. Neo-realists argue that these goals 
systematically rank higher than peace, and therefore states may be prepared to use force to arrive 
at a balanced outcome
66
. Theorists disagree over whether a balance of power helps maintain 
peace, contributes to the onset of war, or whether this is not determinable by the theory
67
.  
The balance of power can be constructed either as a depiction of outcomes, where it reflects the 
‘actual distribution of power in the international system’68, or as a mechanism of behaviour.  
Balancing behaviour by states can be seen as a structural determination and an ‘iron law of 
politics’69, determined by the nature of the international system70; this is called an ‘automatic’ 
balancing system, where states all make choices to pursue their own interest, but their choices 
are determined by the distribution of power, and eventually, states more or less ‘automatically’ 
arrive at a balance of power equilibrium, comparable with the workings of the ‘invisible hand’ 
mechanism in economics.  
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Alternatively, behaviour can be seen as a conscious strategy freely chosen by states, practiced as 
an ‘art’ by political leaders, either consciously or instinctively71. In ‘manual’ systems, balancing 
is a strategy adopted by states and a balanced outcome is the result of ‘conscious and deliberate 
strategic choices by individual states’72, In semi-automatic systems, there is one state in 
particular that serves as the ‘balancer’. In both of these ‘systems’, balancing is less pre-
determined. 
It is sometimes argued that in the Arctic, structural considerations are less relevant than 
elsewhere and agency takes a more prominent role, because the various interests of states and 
governance patterns have not yet been entrenched and there is no ‘weight of history’ behind 
decisions. Dittmer et al. argue comprehensively that Arctic geopolitics ‘recapitulates’ the 
‘implicit determinism’ of realism and other discourses and ‘underscores the emergent, 
performative character of geopolitics and sovereignty’73; and that that due to the exceptional 
nature of the Arctic region, there is instead a peculiar ‘polar geopolitics’74 in the Arctic, driven 
by a different ‘logic’ than elsewhere75. Thus, it would be expected that balancing is more 
‘manual’ and less ‘automatic’ in the Arctic. 
Balancing behaviour by a state can be ‘internal’, by strengthening the state’s own power 
capacities, or ‘external’, by forming alliances76. Within balancing, there is a distinction between 
‘hard’ and ‘soft’ balancing. ‘Hard balancing’ involves intense and open rivalry, with an open 
arms build-up and/or formal alliances between states. The rivalry is often ‘zero-sum’, so that one 
state loses if another state gains, and thus ‘relative gains’ matter most, and cooperation is 
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inhibited.  ‘Soft balancing’ consists of submerged rivalry between states, when states pursue 
preventive rather than confrontational strategies, and relative gains are of limited concern. There 
is only limited arms buildup and rather than open alliances, there are ‘informal, tacit or ad hoc 
security understandings…within or outside of international institutions’77.  However, for the ‘soft 
balancing’ term to have additional explanatory value, rather than being just a  “portentous-
sounding term to describe conventional policy disputes and diplomatic bargaining”78, states’ 
behaviour must be causally linked to their intention or need to balance. Finally, states can engage 
in ‘asymmetrical balancing’ by pursusing nontraditional and different strategies than more 
dominant states
79
, or compensate for their weaker position by heavier commitment to the Arctic 
region than with ‘limited objectives’80. 
Other strategies 
Other rational forms of behaviour for states when a state threatens to become dominant include 
‘bandwagoning’ (going along with the strategies of a dominant state to avoid threats of  that state 
to oneself, and to share in the spoils
81), ‘buck-passing’ (not balancing against a dominant state in 
the hope that other states will do this; a ‘free-rider problem’), and ‘appeasement’ (making 
concessions to a dominant state to prevent conflict)
82
. 
These balance of power theories do not apply unequivocally to the Arctic. It is important to note 
that balance of power theories have been formulated mostly on the empirical basis of power 
games between nation-states on the continent of Europe, particularly in the 18
th
 and 19
th
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century
83
. This bias means that the theory may be time- and space-specific in its relevance. For 
instance, the theory has focused squarely on ‘great powers’84 and in most time periods, there was 
a general consensus on who the great powers in the international system were
85
, but in the Arctic, 
this is not clear, and is different from the power in the international system as a whole. Because 
‘hard power’ is less relevant in the Arctic than in other regions86, there is no clear way to 
‘balance’ against another state’s power. Mearsheimer argues that ‘land force is the dominant 
military power’ and that ‘large bodies of water limit the power projection capabilities of land 
armies’, leading to a situation where the presence of oceans prevents any state from reaching 
hegemony
87
; this is even more the case for ice. Furthermore, because the Arctic is only one of 
the many scenes of foreign policy in which the states interact, a ‘balance of power’ in the Arctic 
is different from the power distribution between these states on the system-level. 
Cooperative strategies 
Realism predicts that a state will be wary of cooperating when another state benefits more and 
thereby gains in ‘relative power’ vis-à-vis the other state88, but in the Arctic, relative gains are 
less important because one state’s gain in capacity does not simply lead to a loss in power for 
other states. States cooperate extensively within institutions in the Arctic, and cooperation can be 
a rational strategy for states even from a realist point of view if they can work in their mutual 
interests. The environmental issues in the Arctic are suited to constructive cooperation to states’ 
and other actors’ mutual benefit, and cooperation is a more favourable strategy in the Arctic than 
                                                          
83
 Levy 2004, 38-41. 
84
 Levy 2004, 38-41. 
85
 Art 1999, 185. 
86
 As described under the ‘power’ and ‘security’ sections in this thesis. 
87
 Mearsheimer 2001. 
88
 Brawley 2004, 78. 
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in other areas due to the region’s unique geographic nature; this is sometimes called ‘Arctic 
exceptionalism’89. 
Research design 
The central puzzle to this thesis is why the Arctic situation has thus far had an absence of open 
conflict or diplomatic crises even though actors have different interests and the stakes are rising. 
The main analytical question shall be, ‘What is the configuration of power between the Arctic 
states and to what extent does balancing take place?’ The subsequent explanatory question is: 
‘Does the current political situation in the Arctic reflect the power configuration and states’ 
interests?’ 
In this thesis, a comprehensive analysis of the Arctic situation will be made from the perspective 
of states’ national interests, and the distribution of power in the Arctic between the various actors 
involved will be assessed. Whilst most analyses of the Arctic situation have attempted to explain 
the current stability from a neo-liberal institutionalist perspective by highlighting the success of 
institutional and diplomatic cooperation in practice
90
, an even more robust explanation for the 
current situation could be given if it is demonstrated that the current situation is also a logical 
outcome resulting from states’ most fundamental interests and power capacities. 
The ‘current political situation’ is largely constituted by states’ sovereignty over Arctic territory, 
which determines who has control over territory, and thus what ‘outcomes’ occur and how power 
is shaped. Therefore, the ways in which sovereignty is demarcated will be discussed extensively. 
States’ behaviour in sovereignty disputes will then be analyzed to assess their behaviour. States’ 
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formal Arctic strategies and policies shall be discussed to discover their interests and intentions 
in the region, and to analyze whether states do indeed have sovereignty and security as their 
priorities, as realism predicts. 
It will be analyzed whether states engage in ‘soft’ and/or ‘hard’ balancing behaviour, and 
whether weaker states use the alternative strategies of ‘bandwagoning’, ‘buck-passing’, and/or 
‘appeasement’ towards dominant states. It shall be assessed whether states face a security 
dilemma in the Arctic and an ‘arms race’ is taking place, and whether this has explanatory value 
for states’ behaviour. Another relevant consideration is if states know each other’s intentions and 
strategies, and if they behave as unitary actors on Arctic issues. 
States’ engagement with institutions and their diplomatic and strategic cooperation will be 
assessed from the perspective of their national interest to see whether states’ behaviour is rational 
from a realist perspective. It will be taken into account that the Arctic is a region within the 
larger system-level, so that states can demonstrate intentions, shape expectations, and set 
precedents relevant to other international arenas.  
Delimitation in scope and time 
The Arctic shall be defined in the conventional manner, as the entire area lying north of the 
Arctic Circle at 66°33’ northern latitude91. The five ‘core’ Arctic countries, which possess land 
territory within the Arctic Circle, are Russia, Canada, the US, Denmark (Greenland), and 
Norway, together commonly called the ‘Arctic five’92 or ‘Arctic rim’93 . These will be the 
primary focus of this thesis, with the unit of analysis being the state level. 
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The three other Arctic Council member states, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland, have sea territories 
within the Arctic Circle and also have relevant interests
94
. However, these states do not mention 
sovereignty and security among their strategic priorities in the Arctic. Other states and bodies, 
such as China, South Korea and the European Union, have applied unsuccessfully for Arctic 
Council permanent observer status, and have asserted an interest in the region because the Arctic 
and the North Pole are ‘important geographical markers’ in a global sense and therefore not the 
exclusive province of the neighbouring states
95
. All these states do not control or claim 
sovereignty over any region within the Arctic Circle, and do not have the material capacities to 
be major actors in the Arctic
96
. This makes them more marginal and less suitable for analysis 
from a realist perspective, because their influences and stakes are more indirect and diffuse and 
thereby harder to analyze objectively. Other stakeholders include non-state actors such as the 
indigenous Inuit, of which five representative organs are permanent observers at the Arctic 
Council, corporations, and NGOs. more marginally, the European Union, China, and South 
Korea, who have applied unsuccessfully for permanent observer status.  
 
Because the configuration of Arctic region is changing quickly due to climate change and the 
fast melting of ice, its geostrategic dynamics are constantly altering. Therefore, this thesis will 
focus on a specific time period, so that the dynamics in this specific period may become clearer 
and do not get confounded with earlier, outdated patterns. In 2007, interest in the Arctic rose due 
to the announcement of the ‘Ilulissat Declaration’ by the Arctic five states and due to the large 
attention paid to Russia’s flag planting, and developments in Arctic diplomacy have accelerated 
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since, with more strategies being announced and more sovereignty disputes being resolved; 
hence, this thesis will largely be limited for the period from 2007 until the present, not 
speculating on uncertain future developments. 
Sovereignty 
Principles 
The Arctic is nowadays not a terra nullius
97
, since most territory in the region is demarcated
98
. 
Almost all land in the region belongs clearly to one of the ‘Arctic five’ states with land territory 
in the region, with only a few disputes remaining. These disputes often arise because of 
overlapping legal frameworks, so rather than an anarchic situation where states can arbitrarily 
claim sovereignty, the regulation may actually be too complex
99
. Sovereignty has since the 18
th
 
century been associated with the principle of ‘effective occupation’100, which is hardly possible 
in the Arctic. The historical ideals of sovereignty in the ‘Westphalian’ state system have assumed 
a distinction between land over which states will claim authority, and areas of water, which 
cannot be absolutely controlled
101
, but in the Arctic, sovereignty is more unclear because of the 
mixture between land, ice, and water. More generally, modern sovereignty presupposes an ideal 
of ‘permanence’ which is absent in the changing environment of the Arctic102. 
Canada has asserted that there is a ‘physical unity’ between the land and sea in the Arctic due to 
the ‘quasi-permanence’ of the ice, and attempted to show that its citizens have always treated the 
                                                          
97
 Heininen 2012, 8. 
98
 Economist 2012, 2. 
99
 Laruelle 2010, 16. 
100
 Svarlien 1960, 248. 
101
 Steinberg 2001, cited in Gerhardt et al. 2010, 993. 
102
 Gerhardt et al. 2010, 994. 
Skander Mabrouk A polar balance? Thesis research proposal 
22 
ice the same as the land, in order to bolster its claims for sovereignty over waters between their 
Arctic islands
103. The United States, on the other hand, has opposed that ice or ‘frozen water’ is 
beyond any state’s territory104. 
The maritime territory of states can be asserted through various principal approaches. These 
include the ‘sector principle’, which is based on the ‘sector’ that appears when meridians are 
drawn through the extreme points of a state’s coast line105. This principle has historically been 
supported only by Canada and Russia, because it grants them more territory due to their long 
coast lines and is thus in their interest
106
. Another principle is the ‘equidistance’ or ‘median line’ 
principle, which determines that a line should be drawn in the middle of the distance between 
two states’ baselines. This principle was included in the original 1958 Territorial Sea Convention 
as relevant in cases where no special circumstances applied
107
, but because it often led to results 
that were considered inequitable or unreasonable
108
, it was not included in UNCLOS except in 
article 15, which merely stated that no state is entitled to cross the median line in its claims if 
they fail to reach an agreement with the other state
109
. States can, however, still apply this 
principle within their mutual negotiations, and several have done so, as shall be outlined later. 
Therefore, these principles retain their significance next to the main institutional framework. 
Rather than merely being about territorial rights of ownership, sovereignty in the Arctic is 
considered to be based more on a ‘set of responsibilities and commitments’110 with respect to 
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specific issues. Sovereignty is also directly related to security, without which sovereignty ‘cannot 
mean very much’111. 
International law 
The main international regulatory framework for the Arctic waters is the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
112
, which came into force in 1982 after long 
negotiations. UNCLOS is an elaborate treaty that broadly ‘frames the conduct, responsibilities 
and rights of states with regard to national and international zones in the sea’. Thereby, the 
convention creates a basic legal foundation for sovereignty assertion over sea areas, and it can 
serve as a ‘framework’ or a ‘visionary template’ ‘to integrate and interpret legal strategies at all 
scales from all institutions throughout the world’113; thus, it is the main point of reference for 
states in the Arctic
114
. UNCLOS is in force for more than 155 states, including all Arctic states, 
except the United States, which has not ratified the convention, yet accepts all the sea zones 
under ‘customary international law’115. 
UNCLOS applies to oceans and high seas and determines the rights for coastal states to claim 
waters as their sovereign maritime zones and as exclusive economic zones (EEZs). The standard 
limit for these zones is 200 nautical miles, in which states can claim authority unless another 
state is closer
116
. This is determined from a ‘baseline’, which is often problematic to identify on 
ice-covered coasts
117
; there it is frequently unclear where land ends and water begins
118
. 
Furthermore, states may assert baselines around their straits and archipelagos that join their 
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islands to the mainland and thus claim the waterways inbetween as sovereign ‘internal 
waters’119; Russia and Canada have made such claims, and the US has protested these on all 
accounts, believing the waters to be international straits where there is a universal right for 
‘transit passage’120. 
In the case that an ‘outer continental shelf’ (OCS) which a state lies upon extends further than 
200 nautical miles, states can claim ‘seabed rights’ over seas as far as 350 nautical miles121, or 
even beyond that if ‘natural prolongation’ of the shelf is proven’122. Seabed rights give states 
exclusive sovereign rights to exploit the resources in the area, but not ‘sovereignty’123, since the 
water and sea ice remain part of the international ‘high seas’124. At least 53% of the seabed of the 
Arctic Ocean consists of continental shelf
125
 States cannot unilaterally claim this territory, but 
they can submit a claim to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) as 
regulated by article 76 of UNCLOS; however, critical definitions of many terms in this article 
are unclear
126
, and there is thus room for interpretation. The most significant of these ridges are 
the Lomonosov, Mendeleyev, and Alpha Ridges
127
; Russia has claimed that the former two are 
extensions of its continental shelf
128
, whilst Denmark is examining the geological linkage of the 
Lomonosov shelf with Greenland
129
, and Norway has made a submission for various seas and 
basins
130
. These claims can potentially overlap in the central Arctic Ocean, so that this procedure 
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may not give full resolution to states’ sovereignty claims131, and the CLCS will not make 
recommendations on overlapping claims, leaving them to states’ mutual negotiation132; thus, 
states’ diplomacy and power relations are still quite important. 
The CLCS examines submissions by states based on geophysical evidence (seismic and 
bathymetric data
133
) of the extent of the state’s continental shelf, that has to show that ‘the depth 
and shape of the seabed and the thickness of underlying sediments indicate a natural 
prolongation of the shelf closer inshore’134. The CLCS attempts to have a role as a strictly 
scientific and technical body, not wanting to engage itself in political or legal disputes
135
. 
However, submissions by states to the CLCS are not made readily available to other states, so 
that they are unable to challenge assertions
136
, and the commission does not release its exact 
conclusions
137
. It is considered by critics to be governed by political imperatives
138
 and is opaque 
in its functioning even though its conclusions have potentially large political implications. This is 
an illustration of how power is shaped through institutional structure in the Arctic. 
Because the procedure takes a long time, and the commission has demanded more information 
from certain states, however, no rulings have yet been made and therefore the outcome of this 
process in terms of sovereignty or power is still unclear. Although the CLCS formally makes 
recommendations that are not legally binding
139
, all the Arctic states presenting their claims to 
the CLCS have shown every indication of willing to abide by the outcomes, and have asserted in 
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the Ilulissat Declaration that they ‘remain committed to this legal framework [UNCLOS] and to 
the orderly settlement of any overlapping claims’140. 
 
Figure 1 (adapted from Powell 2008, 828): This map shows the extent of the ridges that Russia 
attempts to claim as extensions of its outer continental shelf. 
The part of the seabed in the central Arctic Ocean that remains unclaimed could be regulated in 
accordance with UNCLOS by the International Seabed Authority, which is intended to 
implement a ‘common-heritage’ regime so that all states gain equal access and rights to exploit 
resources in the region
141
; this institution may have an independent interest in governing the area 
as shared territory so that its jurisdiction is expanded
142
, and this would also be in the interest of 
non-Arctic five actors. 
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The UNCLOS treaty was not designed with the Arctic in mind and hence does not necessarily 
reflect the interests and relations between actors in the Arctic, but nevertheless applies to the 
Arctic; this is an example of ‘path-dependent’ institutional development. However, Article 234 
of the convention refers to ice-covered establishes a special provision for almost-permanently 
ice-covered areas and was likely to be intended to apply to the Arctic; it is often referred to as the 
‘Arctic article’143. It regulates the rights of coastal states to adopt laws and regulations for the 
control of marine pollution, but, according to the treaty text, only ‘where particularly severe 
climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create 
obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could 
cause major harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance’144. What regions this 
applies to is open to various interpretations. Therefore, states can navigate within this regulation 
to claim the right to apply regulations if this is in their interests, and thus have considerable 
leeway, but they are still constrained by the (vague) limitations of this article. The article was 
included in the UNCLOS charter because of diplomatic efforts by Canada and the USSR, so that 
earlier measures by these states, such as the Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act, would gain 
international legitimacy
145
. The article is based on a recognition that special regulation is 
necessary for the governance of territory which does not fall into a binary classification of land 
or water
146
 
The UNCLOS framework determines the areas over which states conflict, because certain 
regions gain disproportionate significance due to the details of the sovereignty claims under 
international law. For instance, national appropriation of an insignificant island may mean that 
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many further claims to waters in the vicinity of that island can be legally substantiated, and 
therefore such islands become of disproportionate value for states
147
. Institutions can thus also 
work to exacerbate conflict in the Arctic rather than prevent it. 
Institutions and organizations 
The institutions governing the Arctic, such as the Arctic Council and its working groups, are 
based on intrastate cooperation. The Council is explicitly forbidden from dealing with ‘matters 
related from military security’148, thus limiting its efficacy compared to states; this could also 
lead to its exclusion from issues of environmental security. The institutional structure of the 
Arctic Council has not been significantly strengthened
149
, although a Secretariat was established 
in 2011
150
. Because strategic cooperation within the Arctic Council is non-binding
151
, the 
Council has only limited autonomous capacity for formulating strong independent governance 
regimes. Because the Council’s funding has been ad hoc, and no serious discussion has taken 
place to introduce requirements for permanent contributions from member states
152
, and the level 
of commitment by member states within the Arctic Council has generally been low. 
The Arctic Council is based on a declaration and not on a formal treaty. Since it has no authority 
to adopt resolutions that are legally binding, nor compliance or enforcement mechanisms, it is 
firmly based on a ‘soft-law’ approach to governance, as are various other Arctic conventions and 
arrangements, such as specific environmental treaties
153
. This makes it weak at cooperative 
governance above the level of states and makes it unlikely that the Council pursues a 
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supranational agenda independent from states’ national interests, but gives states greater political 
flexibility to shape the workings of the organization according to their own interests and relations 
and adapt to the changing geopolitical situation in the Arctic. This potentially grants 
opportunities to ‘unsatisfied’ states154 to attempt to change arrangements to their own benefit and 
mould the status quo, for instance by adopting new treaties that create regional regimes for 
regulating exploitation within a sea that are more in a state’s interest. 
Literature review 
The literature on the Arctic consists of academic literature, and strategic documents. The core of 
the academic literature consists of geopolitical analyses of the relations between states in the 
Arctic, but many discussions blend with political geography and international law; because 
sovereignty disputes are usually intertwined with such considerations, and these cannot be 
discarded in favour of a purely political science approach. Strategic documents and policy 
analyses on the Arctic have focused on a broad array of concrete security and cooperation issues. 
These documents are often from advisory committees and government departments, and can be 
biased and written from a certain perspective, but this can give insight into the interests, 
intentions, and perceptions of states in the region, and the arguments given for and against 
certain policies in the region could forecast future action. 
 
Because the Arctic evokes images of a region of exploration and possibilities, it is often viewed 
from a discursive perspective that emphasizes the future over the present
155
. This, combined with 
the fact that the region is currently underdeveloped but rapidly changing in its environment, has 
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led most authors to focus on describing what may happen in the Arctic in the future. As a result, 
much of the literature has been speculative. Because the Arctic is of interest for policymakers, 
much research has focused on prospective resource extraction and environmental security
156
, 
possible future developments in this regard, and viable strategies for states. This research has 
highlighted potential areas of conflict or cooperation and painted various future scenarios
157
.  
The next section will give an overview on the depictions of this in the literature. However, in this 
thesis, only the present situation shall be analyzed, and the underlying configuration of power 
will be assessed, rather than a counterfactual analysis of what might happen if conflict would 
occur later. 
Ruling interpretations 
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Figure 2 (adapted from Palosaari 2011, 23): This table sums up the ruling interpretations of the 
Arctic situation in the academic literature. 
Figure 3 (adapted from Bennett 
2010): This illustrates the future 
scenarios for the Arctic that are 
often painted in the academic 
literature and the media. A (neo-
)realist outlook often uses the 
‘Arctic Race’ frame, which has 
the most potential for anarchic 
conflict. 
Conflict frame 
The Arctic has been cast more into the public and academic spotlight largely after Russia’s flag 
planting in 2007, and the attention was amplified by the rapid melting of ice in recent years. The 
region has often been framed in media outlets and by some early researchers as a hotbed for 
potential conflict or even ‘the next ‘hot spot’ in the sphere of international relations’158. The most 
frequently cited article on the Arctic from within this ‘conflict’ frame, by Scott Borgerson in 
Foreign Affairs
159
, identified various threats in the region and highlighted the potential for 
conflict from an understated neo-realist perspective. This article asserted that the lack of 
‘overarching political or legal structures that can provide for the orderly development of the 
region’, i.e. anarchy, could lead to conflict due to militarism, nationalism and political 
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opportunism
160
. Other authors and commentators have argued that states in the Arctic are 
engaged in an ‘arms race’161, and that the region has a potential for a ‘dramatic swing in conflict 
likelihood’ due to climate change162. 
There has been an understanding that ‘a ‘great game’ is taking place in the Arctic’, which 
thereby ‘appears as a ‘test site’ for the international relations of the future characterized by 
scarcity of energy resources’163. It was speculated that ‘if ground rules are not agreed, the area’s 
oil, gas and other as yet undiscovered resources could spark conflict’164. Furthermore, direct 
maritime control is important because states that rule the Arctic trading routes are considered to 
‘comman[d] the new transit system and strategies of global trade’165. Views such as those 
expressed in Borgerson’s article and in similar neo-realist accounts have been influential in the 
media
166
, but have been heavily criticized by experts on the region.  
Cooperation frame 
Most experts on the region have asserted that peaceful diplomatic and institutional cooperation 
within the Arctic is more prominent than conflict. Palosaari argues that it is in states’ interests to 
keep the Arctic situation stable, because they view it as a ‘welcome exception’ with respect to 
other areas of oil and gas production which are often rife with political instability and conflict
167
. 
Byers
168
  has said that in the Arctic ‘the distances are very large, the costs of operations are 
extremely high and the benefits of cooperation are undeniable…So if you deal with the realities 
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of the North, the specter of wars and gunships and conflict disappear very quickly. The reason 
northern peoples like the Inuit are so incredibly cooperative is that if you don’t cooperate in the 
Arctic, you don’t survive.’ Likewise, Elliot-Meisel169 claims that Arctic nations have, even 
whilst pursuing their own interest, found that cooperating together ‘can advance their national 
agendas, build alliances, reap valuable information, and save money’. 
Effective management of activities in the Arctic requires coordination rather than confrontation; 
some major issues are search-and-rescue of ships and tourists, the common management of 
fisheries, prevention of oil spills and general environmental protection and handling the effects 
of climate change, and all of these cannot be managed by states on their own
170
. Oil and gas can 
only be extracted when there is no open conflict in the region and states cooperate due to the 
environmental security challenges of producing and transporting the resources
171
. Within this 
framework, in other words, the Arctic situation is not a zero-sum game where one state’s gain is 
the other’s loss, but requires cooperation to achieve a ‘positive sum’ outcome, even if this is 
meant to guarantee states’ national interests. 
Some of these authors have seen the ‘regionalization’172 in the 1990s, when ‘regional and 
subregional organisations’173 were founded that divided jurisdiction over the Arctic on different 
policy issues between states, as the disengagement of states’ ‘high politics’ from the region. For 
instance, there were various regional fishing organisations that gave some states control over 
fishing agreements in specific regions. However, rather than as a positive-sum institutional 
cooperation, this could also be viewed as a mere practical division of power between states. 
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Country strategies 
Security and sovereignty issues, which are central to this thesis, are treated differently by the 
Arctic five countries in their official Arctic strategies. Whilst Canada and the United States have 
security and sovereignty as their main priorities and goals in the Arctic, Norway and Denmark 
merely see these as tools to help achieve other priorities, and Russia occupies a place in 
between
174
. The other member states of the Arctic Council, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden, do not 
mention sovereignty and security among their strategic priorities in the Arctic
175
. In this section, 
each individual state’s strategy will be discussed under ‘interests and intentions’, followed by an 
outlining of the state’s actual capabilities. 
Russia 
Interests and intentions 
Russia is a ‘relative late-comer’ to the Arctic because it has only had a discernable and 
comprehensive Arctic policy since 2007
176
, during the presidency of Medvedev
177
. Russia has 
made control over the Arctic ‘a top domestic and foreign policy goal’178, and asserted its aim that 
the Arctic would become Russia’s  leading strategic base by 2016179. 
Russia is now often portrayed as an ‘exceptional Arctic stakeholder’180 or as ‘the’ Arctic 
nation
181
. Russia is the country which has the longest Arctic coastline (over 7000 kilometres, 
versus only 1600 for the US, for example), covering nearly half of the latitudinal circle
182
 and the 
most populated Arctic region, with roughly half of the four million Arctic inhabitants being 
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Russian
183
. The Arctic is central to Russia’s economy, as shown by its previous extensive 
investments in infrastructure
184
 and the emphasis of Russia’s strategy on the region as a major 
source of revenue from energy production and marine transport
185
. Channon, Plouffe, and 
Roussel argue therefore that Russia is the’ regional hegemon’ in the Arctic186. 
Russia is sometimes seen as a threat to a liberal and cooperative Arctic order by European and 
North-American observers, who perceive Russia as expansionist and self-interested
187
. 
According to Baev
188
, parts of its elite have a perception of ‘an inherently hostile external 
environment’, with deep mistrust in NATO and a suspicious view of the US and its global 
hegemonism, and the internal bureaucratic structure is such that it stimulates proactive moves in 
international relations. Russia’s relationship with NATO deteriorated after the war in Georgia189. 
However, Russia has actually been very cooperative and conciliatory with western countries on 
Arctic issues
190
, and in 2010 then-prime minister Putin stated that Russia thinks ‘it is imperative 
to keep the Arctic as a zone of peace and cooperation’, since ‘we all know how hard it is to live 
alone in the Arctic’191. 
Russia’s strategy emphasizes its commitment to international law and bilateral cooperation192, 
and Russia works well within UNCLOS procedures for sovereignty disputes. This is in its 
national interest; because Russia possesses the largest Arctic coastline, it has the most to gain by 
the current UNCLOS procedure of appropriating seabed rights. Russia’s main priorities in the 
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region are economic
193
. It focused heavily on energy security in its national security strategy of 
2009, and has stated that it does ‘not exclude the use of military means in order to defend its 
energy interest’194. If Russia can gain control over masses of energy resources, this might further 
enhance its global geopolitical status as a controller of energy supplies and give it leverage over 
other countries
195
; thus, the Arctic is even more relevant to Russia on a system level. The Arctic 
is perceived by Russia as a geopolitical “frontier” where it should use its competitive advantages 
and assert its claims, since a demonstrated  readiness by Russia to advance its national interests 
shows its strength in the broader international arena
196
. 
Capabilities 
Russia’s military capabilities in the region are large and its presence has been intensified in 
recent years
197
. Russia is active in remilitarization, and has aimed at ‘showing global military 
stretch’ in the Arctic region198, in part to provide a symbol of Russia’s ‘great power’ status199. 
For instance, in 2007 the Russian air force resumed its ‘long-range strategic bomber patrol 
flights’ over the Arctic, which had been suspended ever since the end of the Cold War200. 
However, Russia’s former defence minister Ivanov has stated that this did not ‘signify a return to 
“bloc thinking”’ because the flights were conducted in ‘specific regions where [Russia’s] 
economic interests are present, including navigation
 201, called by Putin ‘combat patrolling of 
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strategic character’.  In 2011, Russia unveiled plans to employ an Arctic Brigade with 8,000 
troops less than 20 km from the border with Norway
202
. 
Russia dominates in naval terms, since it has the largest ice-breaking fleet in the world, the 
biggest year-round ice-free port/city in the entire Arctic zone (Murmansk), access to the western 
Barents Sea which is ice-free year-round, and it has conducted the most Arctic sorties and thus 
has extensive search-and-rescue capacity
203
. Russia has also conducted naval patrols with 
military vessels in the Arctic
204
, including a transit by Northern Fleet ships
205
. Russia has now 
more military vessels in the Arctic region than it had near the end of the Cold War
206
. Russia is 
planning to rebuild a powerful navy and to lay down new icebreaker ships
207
. However, Russia’s 
fleet has deteriorated and some missiles may be faulty and dangerous to launch, so Russia’s 
strategic posture may be more assertive than its effective military capabilities
208
. It is also argued 
that whilst Russia’s material capabilities are impressive, it does not have the administrative 
efficiency and technological capacity to meet its objectives directly
209
. 
Some other actors which are marginally involved in the Arctic, including the European Union, 
Germany, France, and China, are attempting to strengthen their relations with Russia on Arctic 
measures
210, which indicates that they attempt to ‘bandwagon’ with Russia. 
Flag planting 
Russians have planted a flag on the North Pole on the seabed beneath the water in August 2007, 
after an expedition conceived of by international entrepreneurs who wanted to explore the region 
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and used Russian marine equipment
211
. The expedition had as its goal to garner geological 
evidence for Russia’s territorial claim under UNCLOS, and to assert a ‘solid’ foundation for 
Russia’s claim that its continental shelf extends to the North Pole212. The planting of the flag has 
received a lot of media coverage and faced criticism from politicians of other Arctic countries; 
the Canadian foreign minister said that because ‘this isn’t the 14th or 15th century’, states ‘can’t 
go around the world these days dropping a flag somewhere’, while a US State Department 
spokesman said that the flag planting didn’t ‘have any legal standing or effect’ on claims in the 
region
213
. 
However, all authors in the literature agree upon examination that the flag planting was a 
symbolic episode
214
, or an act of ‘stagecraft’ rather than ‘statecraft’215. This is illustrated by a 
statement of Russia’s foreign minister, who qualified the flag planting as ‘a matter of tradition in 
exploration’, comparable with the planting of the US flag on the moon216. It can even be said to 
have been strategically irrational, because such an open display of sovereignty assertion might 
only provoke countermeasures by other states. Authors agree that the expedition was largely 
irrelevant to actual politics in the region; this is summarized by Dittmer et al.
217
, who write that 
‘neo-realist accounts that would attribute the much-discussed 2007 polar expedition to some 
sovereign geopolitical master-logic must contend with a complex picture that highlights how the 
expedition was improvised, with its supposed geopolitical meaning and significance emerging 
afterwards’. 
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Canada 
In the international arena at large, Canada is a ‘middle power’ when compared with the United 
States and Russia
218
. Regionally speaking, in the Arctic, Canada is one of the largest powers. 
Interests and intentions 
Canada has a huge Arctic territory and is profoundly involved in the region, aggressively 
asserting its sovereignty. Its stance concerning the region is exemplified by its politicians’ 
remarks in speeches in 2007, 2008, and 2010, held in northern (Arctic) locations in the country 
for emphasis. Prime minister Stephen Harper has called Canada’s Arctic ‘central to [its] identity 
as a nation’ because Canadians see themselves as a ‘Northern people’219, and Canada’s claims to 
sovereignty are based on historical Inuit use of territory
220
.  Consequently, Canada expressed the 
view that it ‘must do more to defend [its] Arctic sovereignty’, and publicly highlighted the 
strategic importance of natural resources in the region. This behaviour has been viewed as 
‘posturing’ and considered ‘dogmatic’221, and as driven partly by domestic political 
considerations
222
, since Harper referred to election campaign promises, and may want to assert 
himself as a champion of Canadian interests by appealing to anti-American sentiments among 
the public
223
. However, these proclamations are official and public, and hence one of the clearest 
means to assess the country’s intentions in the region. 
Canada’s intentions in the Arctic are assertive224, because Harper has formulated a principle of 
‘use it or lose it’ and expressed clearly that his government wants to ‘use’ the region. This 
demonstrates a conception of sovereignty as effective occupation and control, rather than a 
                                                          
218
 Channon, Plouffe and Roussel 2012, 48, fn. 1. 
219
 Harper 2008a. 
220
 Dittmer et al. 2011, 209. 
221
 Dodds 2010b, 371. 
222
 Heininen 2012, 17. 
223
 Elliot-Meisel 2009, 219; Hough 2012, 78. 
224
 Dodds 2010b, 371. 
Skander Mabrouk A polar balance? Thesis research proposal 
40 
matter of theoretical recognition.  Indeed, Harper has claimed that defending Canada’s northern 
sovereignty demands the maintenance of a ‘capacity to act’225, and thus it is necessary to analyze 
to what extent it has effective capabilities. 
Canada’s formal strategy has as its ‘number one Arctic foreign policy priority’ the imposition of 
Canada’s Arctic maritime sovereignty226.  This requires ‘enhancing stewardship’ by ‘taking 
concrete measures to protect [Canadian] Arctic waters’, for instance by introducing new ‘ballast 
water control regulations’227.  
Capabilities 
Harper has highlighted the importance of Canada’s capabilities on land, sea, and in the air, by 
referring to ‘Arctic rangers’, ‘patrol ships’, and ‘aerial surveillance’ in his speeches, respectively. 
Canada is expanding its military capability in the region, and has announced new funding for 
Arctic patrol vessels, a deep-water port, and a training centre for activities in the region
228
.  
Canada has attempted to assert its sovereignty in the Arctic through ‘effective occupation’ by 
patrols of Canadian Rangers, travelling through the Arctic for no reason other than to provide a 
visible presence and ‘demonstrate a response capability in the most remote areas of the North’229. 
However, Canada’s actual military capabilities in the region are limited, with no new icebreakers 
having been constructed and no advancements having being made in the construction of a new 
military base in Resolute Bay
230
. Therefore, there is somewhat of an effective discrepancy 
between Canada’s rhetoric and its actual efficacy; or even a ‘credibility gap’ between Canada’s 
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assertions of sovereignty in the Arctic, and its abilities to enforce them
231
. Thus, authors have 
asserted that Canada’s tough posturing is ‘more rhetoric than reality’232 and ‘little more than 
paper sovereignty’233. 
United States 
Interests and intentions 
The US, a global hegemonic superpower, is only marginally involved in the Arctic and has been 
‘unable and unwilling to enter into a hegemonic role’ in the region234. The US has not formally 
ratified UNCLOS, ever since the Reagan administration raised objections to the ´common 
heritage’ principle235, and whilst more recent administrations have supported ratification236, this 
has consistently been blocked by the Senate. As a result, the US is ‘not being allowed into the 
game’237, cannot sue other states in the relevant international courts when a conflict arises238, and 
cannot make legal territorial submissions to the CLCS. The US’s ‘isolationist’ approach and  its 
refusal to ratify UNCLOS have been considered irrational by many commentators
239
.  The US 
has made no attempt to formulate an alternative legal regime over the oceans or the Arctic in 
particular, and thus does not exercise ‘structural power’ in this regard. 
Many authors have asserted, therefore, that the US has a lack of political commitment to the 
Arctic
240, and it is often referred to as the ‘reluctant Arctic power’241.  Others, however, assess 
that the US is still actively involved in the region and that “it would be fair to say that 
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theoretically, the US position towards the circumpolar region remains traditional, in the sense 
that it is based upon a state-centered agenda in which security and national interests are 
emphasised, although with recognition of the broader context of globalization”242. 
The US acts more as a unitary state with respect to the Arctic than before, because there is now a 
single military commander over the region
243
, and all the US executive departments concerned 
with the region are now coordinated by the Secretary of State
244
. 
From 2009 onwards, the US has a new policy on the Arctic, the United States Arctic Region 
Policy
245
. This policy is a more assertive expression of US interest in the region, and states that it 
has been influenced by four new developments: ‘updated US policies on homeland defence and 
security; the impact of climate change and increase in human traffic in the Arctic region; the 
establishment and growing influence of the Arctic Council; and the recognition of significant 
potential natural resources’. The policy extends beyond national security interests and includes 
common issues such as international governance and cooperation
246
. Specifically, the policy 
mentions that “the United States must project “sea power throughout the region” and that the 
government must now act to “develop greater capabilities and capacity, as necessary, to project 
United States air, land, and sea borders in the Arctic region”247. However, it does not mention a 
pressing need for the US to build new icebreaker ships, even though it takes around five years to 
build a new icebreaker
248
. 
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Capabilities 
Due to the lack of commitment by the United States to the Arctic, its real capabilities in the 
region are limited. From a realist perspective, then, the US is not so influential in the region 
because it has too few military and economic capabilities to gain bargaining leverage. The US 
has only one operational icebreaker, which has only practical and no military capacities
249
. The 
US Coast Guard has asserted that budget cuts have led to a risk that the US icebreaking 
capability has become at risk of ‘being unable to support national interests’ in the polar 
regions
250
. 
Norway 
Interests and intentions 
The Arctic has attracted a significant amount of attention in Norway’s foreign policy, as evident 
by its ‘High North Strategy’251, which aims to ‘raise the profile’ of Norway’s Arctic policy 
internationally. This strategic outline lists as the ‘main political priorities’ for Norway in the 
region the ‘exercise [of] authority in the High North in a credible, consistent and predictable 
way’, through ‘maintaining its presence and exercising its sovereignty and authority’252, 
illustrating  that Norway also uses a conception of sovereignty in the Arctic as the active 
demonstration of occupation of territory. Furthermore, the Norwegian government wants to 
invest in the development of (scientific) knowledge on the region, including ‘geological 
surveys’253, which not only opens up opportunities for exploitation, but also may give Norway 
further information to back up geological claims to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) and gain recognized territory. 
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The strategy includes a focus on environmental (security) issues and on the possibilities of 
regional economic development, including ‘petroleum activities’ in particular. To this extent, 
Norway openly focuses on the potential for resource extraction in the Barents Sea and Svalbard 
regions. These regions receive priority in Norway’s strategy.  
Capabilities 
The Norwegian state has sizable administrative capacities for the Arctic, and high general 
institutional efficiency in general
254
; it also has high technological capabilities for petroleum 
extraction
255
. Norway has been a front-runner in the re-militarization of the Arctic, and its 
defence budget has been increasing during the past years. Because Norway is a major coastal 
state with jurisdiction over approximately two million square kilometres, six times its land 
territory
256, it has a large focus on maritime issues in its international policies. Norway’s 
Northern fleet is modern, capable of conducting long-range operations, and has a larger overall 
tonnage than Russia’s or Denmark’s257. Norway has also built new several sea frigates, which is 
‘said to be the most expensive armaments project in the country’s history’258, and has lifted 
restrictions on military exercises in its northern county of Finnmark
259
. In August 2009, Norway 
became the first country that located the leadership of its military command in the Arctic, 
moving its Operational Command Headquarters to Bodø
260
. Norway has been expanding its 
activities northward due to the importance of its gas to the EU’s energy supply261 
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Denmark 
Interests and intentions 
The Kingdom of Denmark includes Greenland, which is the region that lies within the Arctic. 
Danish strategy on the Arctic is a result of cooperation between Denmark and the partially 
autonomous government of Greenland
262
. Due to Greenland’s movement toward more 
independence, Denmark as such may not consider the Arctic to be of ‘paramount long term 
national strategic interest’ and may be less committed to the region263. 
The Danish strategy focuses on cooperation and clearly stresses the importance of international 
law in the region, with an emphasis on the development of a new ‘Polar Code’ with binding rules 
and standards for states on navigation in the Arctic
264
. Enforcing sovereignty is less important in 
Denmark’s strategy, being discussed in just two pages in the 58-page document, and nowhere is 
it mentioned that Denmark’s sovereignty is perceived to be threatened, by other states or 
otherwise
265
 
Capabilities 
Denmark has a large Arctic territory on Greenland, and both excellent technological capabilities 
and institutional efficiency in general and with respect to the Arctic in particular
266
. Its maritime 
capabilities are good, because it has a modern and very capable navy
267
, with renewed offshore 
patrol vessels around Greenland, although the navy has become smaller in recent years
268
, just as 
its total armed forces
269
. 
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Relations with other states 
Denmark is the only of the countries that emphasizes in its strategy the importance of NATO and 
of cooperation specifically within the ‘Arctic five’270. Denmark wants to cooperate with Canada 
on research on the extent of the continental shelf for a CLCS submission, and with the US 
through the broadly-based Denmark-Greenland-USA ‘Joint Committee’, a high-level 
intergovernmental forum
271
. Russia, according to Baev
272
, does not take Denmark seriously and 
relegates its claims to the Lomonosov Ridge as ‘scientific oddities’. 
Because Denmark is the only Arctic rim state that is a member of the European Union, it also has 
to consider the EU’s interest in its strategy. This could explain Denmark’s cooperative attitude, 
because this is what gives the EU the most potential room to participate in Arctic governance. 
Since Denmark is a smaller player within the Arctic five, its strategy, in sum, seems to be mostly 
that of ‘bandwagoning’ with the greater powers in the Arctic, and achieving a balance between 
the NATO partner states by cooperating within institutions on an equal footing. 
Country relations 
In this section, the diplomatic relations between the largest Arctic states shall be discussed, as 
well as the important relationship between Norway and Russia. 
NATO cooperation 
The smaller Nordic states are cooperating extensively in the Arctic; Norway, Denmark, and 
Sweden formulated common objectives for their Arctic Council chairmanships
273
, and wanting to 
                                                          
270
 Heininen 2012, 21. 
271
 Joint Committee, n.d. 
272
 Baev 2007, 11 
273
 Kao ea 2012, 836. 
Skander Mabrouk A polar balance? Thesis research proposal 
47 
demonstrate collective solidarity
274
. In the past, Iceland and Norway in particular have suggested 
that NATO should play an increased role in the Arctic
275
. 
Blunden has argued that the main opposition in the Arctic exists between the four Arctic five 
NATO countries on the one hand, and Russia on the other hand, with fault-lines ‘deepening’276. 
NATO is present in the Arctic with its integrated air-defence system and has increased its 
visibility in the area
277
. One of the main threats to Russia is that the four NATO states in the 
region, plus possibly the UK, form a coalition against Russia or do a collective reply to its 
challenges, and in a potential conflict, NATO could affect the balance of forces by bottling up its 
fleet
278
The Swedish Defence Minister in 2008 openly conceded that the NATO decision to 
cooperate more closely ‘is happening against a background in which Russia is raising its foreign 
policy ambitions’, and thus, this is clearly balancing behaviour. It is therefore in Russia’s 
interest that the NATO states continue to have disputes among each other, so that they are too 
divided to form a unitary policy
279. A case in point may be that Russia supports Canada’s claim 
of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, which could be meant to prolong the division 
between Canada and the US on this issue. 
 
Canada-Russia 
Canada is ‘watched carefully’ by Russia, but Russia assumes that there is not much direct 
conflict between its claims and Canadian interests
280
.  Russia is the only other state to support 
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Canada’s sovereignty over the Northwest Passage281. Russia and Canada share an interest in 
excluding countries other than the Arctic five, and are the states that have the most to gain by 
current UNCLOS procedures of determining sea territory
282
. 
Canada, however, does take a stance against Russia, and Canadian-Russian relations have 
deteriorated since Harper became the Canadian prime minister; according to former Canadian 
ambassador to Russia Christopher Westdal, Harper ‘came with [a] baggage of deep suspicion of 
Russia’ and relations have become more confrontational as a result283. However, Canada does 
not really balance against Russia, because it does not urge the United States to increase its 
capabilities in the Arctic, and because Canada is opposed to expanding influence over the Arctic 
to states outside the Arctic Five
284
. Instead of balancing, Canada uses a ‘go-it-alone’ approach to 
the Arctic that is inconsistent with conventional strategies and perhaps unadvised
285
. This is, 
however, consistent with realist theory about ‘self-help’ behaviour of states. 
Norway-Russia 
Norway is perceived by Russia as a ‘familiar and predictable neighbour’, more concerned with 
its own claims than Russia’s286. Russia has adopted a hard tone against Norway in the region and 
conducted naval exercises along Norway’s coastline287 in the late 2000s, and Norway has led 
NATO military security exercises near the Russian border
288
, feeling a need to make its military 
presence better felt in the Arctic
289
. 
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Whilst formerly, Norway had a pivotal geostrategic role as a NATO state bordering Russia in the 
north, it is now becoming more independent in its behaviour toward Russia
290
. Norway stated in 
its 2006 strategy that it particularly important to ‘maintain close bilateral relations’ with 
Russia
291
, and included plans for strengthening cooperation with Russia
292
. Norway is in an 
‘uneasy relationship’ with its large neighbor Russia293, and has been careful not to interpret 
Russian arms buildup as direct pressure on its interests
294
, and to reassure Russia that increased 
NATO presence in the region will not threaten it
295
. Therefore, it seems that Norway wants to 
defuse any potential conflict with the powerful Russian state and that it pursues a strategy of 
‘appeasement’. Diplomatic cooperation is partially necessary necessity because the development 
of resources in the region requires the countries to cooperate, since their territories are closely 
linked
296
.  
United States-Canada 
Canada and the US are often considered ‘natural allies’ and have commitments to each other in 
the broader international relations arena; they are both members of both NATO and NORAD, the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command. Thus, their capacities and security guarantees 
are intertwined and they cannot engage in direct military confrontation in the Arctic, even though 
they have divergent interests. The payoff in confrontation between these states is thus smaller 
than in cooperation. 
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United States-Russia 
The United States is the main focus of Russia’s Arctic policy297. Vice-versa, the United States 
recognizes Russia’s dominant role in the Arctic, and has stated that it ‘will continue to bear in 
mind the significant importance of the Arctic to Russia and other Arctic countries as it develops 
its strategy in the region’298. 
Security and military competition 
Security 
In this section, it will be analyzed whether states engage in active competition with each other on 
(military) security in the Arctic, which could mean that there is a realist ‘security dilemma’ in the 
Arctic and that balancing behaviour takes place. 
During the Cold War, the Arctic was a theatre where there was a military security dilemma, and 
from the 1970s onwards, there was a mutual arms buildup between the US and the Soviet Union 
in the region
299
. What was most important in military scenarios was were the ability of special 
forces to capture ‘specific sites of strategic importance’300 in the case of an all-out war, rather 
than total control or military occupation of the Arctic. This means that substantial militarization 
and power competition is possible even in this inaccessible region. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, potential traditional all-out ‘warfare’ is not an acute issue in the 
Arctic, and ‘traditional interstate security questions’ have become less relevant301.  What is 
currently most important to states are instead specific, regional security challenges, which form a 
                                                          
297
 Baev 2007, 11. 
298
 Channon, Plouffe, and Roussel 2012, 42 
299
 Kakönen 1992, cited in Palosaari 2011, 22. 
300
 Emmerson 2010, 129. 
301
 Palosaari 2011, 13. 
Skander Mabrouk A polar balance? Thesis research proposal 
51 
fragmented whole
302
.  Security challenges in the Arctic are nowadays not so much about war 
fighting, but about ‘surveillance and control’ in specific emergency scenarios303, which can even 
be civilian rather than military
304
. Examples include ‘intrusion’ scenarios painted in strategic 
documents, such as the entrance of dangerous chemicals or the threat of terrorist sabotage in the 
region. Potential threats are not states but non-state actors, such as traffickers of illegal arms and 
drugs, and terrorists
305
 State strategies, such as that of the United States, even frame security 
challenges merely as ‘operational considerations’ such as ‘communications gaps, search-and-
rescue capacities and situational awareness’306. This implies that (abstract) military power 
maximization is less important than the minimization of concrete threats in the Arctic. Whilst 
permanent occupation of areas in the Arctic is neither possible nor useful for states, states do 
need to have a ‘force-projection capability’ to maintain security in regions of the Arctic307.  
 
Furthermore, security in the Arctic is intertwined with environmental security and human 
security. The melting of icecaps, for instance, directly threatens the populations living in the 
Arctic, because coastal communities are increasingly exposed to storms with less sea ice cover, 
and their health is threatened by the release of atmospheric pollutants and contaminants that were 
hitherto captured in the ice
308
. Since many indigenous peoples living in the Arctic are citizens 
from one of the Arctic states, and will move from regions that become less secure, the effective 
sovereign occupation by states of these regions is eroded in this way. 
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Military competition 
The central geostrategic elements in the Arctic are control over the airspace, surveillance 
capability, and maritime capability
309
. Maritime capability is expressed primarily by the 
possession of suitable Arctic icebreaker ships, which enables traversing of the region, 
sovereignty patrols, and search-and-rescue missions
310
, and thus gives states critical capacities.  
 
The capacities of states’ in these areas can lead to competition and an ‘arms race’. In 2004, it was 
already argued that ‘a silent remilitarization has perhaps started in the Arctic’311. States have 
reacted to each other’s efforts by the establishment of military basements in the Arctic region312, 
and in the late 2000s, the Arctic NATO nations conducted military exercises on a larger scale 
than even during the Cold War
313
; for instance, the largest-ever military exercise was conducted 
in 2011 by more than 1,100 Canadian troops as well as military personnel from Denmark and the 
US
314
.  However, such demonstrations are posturing and do not necessarily reflect actual 
remilitarization
315
. 
 
An ‘arms race’ occurs only if there are simultaneous and abnormal increases in the military 
capacities of countries in a region, with a buildup that is reciprocal and driven by local tensions, 
and thus intended to ‘balance’. Quantitative and qualitative time-based analysis by Lassere, Le 
Roy, and Garon in 2012
316
 has shown that this is not the case in the Arctic, where states do not 
increase their military spending quickly after other states do, or increase spending to an abnormal 
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level. After a decade of less spending, it is now slightly increasing, and this is a normal 
development of military modernization
317
. Rather than engaging in an actual arms race, states are 
attempting to acquire a ‘mobility for preparedness’318 to gain specific security capacities. 
 
Increased military capabilities in the Arctic do not automatically lead to an increased likelihood 
of conflict due to the security dilemma, but have also led to more cooperation
319
. This is 
illustrated by the example of the search-and-rescue agreement of 2011, which has spilled over 
into the security sphere, so that the relationship between the Arctic navies has been 
strengthened
320
.  
Sovereignty disputes 
In the following sections, several relevant recent sovereignty disputes in the Arctic will be 
discussed. Although the legal complications of these disputes are beyond the scope of this thesis, 
states’ asserted points of view and the principles and conceptions of sovereignty used shed light 
upon the political considerations and dynamics in the region. 
There are no remaining land territory disputes in the Arctic, except for an insignificant dispute 
between Canada and Denmark on the status of Hans Island, a tiny (1.3 km²), which is 
approached with humour by both sides and over which an agreement is currently being 
negotiated, with an option being to divide the island exactly in half
321
. Thus, the disputes 
discussed here only concern jurisdiction over the sea and ice. 
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Beaufort Sea  
The sovereignty claims of states are legally so complicated that they are sometimes not even in 
their political interests. A bizarre example is the dispute between Canada and the United States 
over the Beaufort Sea, to which Canada has attempted to apply a form of the sector principle and 
the US the equidistance principle, both in their own interests. It has recently become apparent 
that the continental shelf extends further than 200 nautical miles, and that claims to the seabed 
could thus be made under UNCLOS, but in this case, the presence of Banks Island changes the 
calculations of the equidistance line to such an extent that the US position now probably benefits 
Canada and vice-versa
322
. This illustrates that the issues can be sufficiently unclear that there is 
no way for states to cement their position in a conflict, but that it is rather attractive to negotiate a 
mutually beneficial outcome
323
. 
Northwest Passage 
Figure 4 (adapted from 
Lalonda 2013, 29): This map 
shows the Northwest Passage, 
the places of its recent 
opening, and the various 
disputed areas. 
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The Northwest Passage became ice-free for the first time in the summer of 2005
324
. Research 
institutes have predicted that within the coming decades, the waterways will open up to the 
extent that large vessels will be able to make unassisted transits during the summer
325
. This will 
lead to an increased number of transits by ships through the region, because there are potentially 
significant economic benefits of transit through the passage, which reduces the distance between 
e.g. Rotterdam and Yokohama by over 40% compared to the route via the Suez Canal
326
 , and 
lead to associated security issues. Furthermore, according to a United States Geological Survey 
report, of the oil left in the Arctic, more than half lies underneath the waters of the Northwest 
Passage
327
. The region is relevant beyond the Arctic, because navigation of the Northwest 
Passage will have consequences for the amount of traffic in other important intercontinental 
straits, such as the Panama and Suez Canals
328
. Thus, disputes about the sovereign status of the 
region will be highlighted much more in the coming years
329
. 
 
Canada is formally at dispute with the United States on the status of various waters and the 
Northwest Passage in particular. A country may claim sovereignty over a maritime area on 
historic grounds under international law if it can show that it has effectively exercised its 
exclusive authority on the waters for a considerable length of time and other relevant countries 
have acquiesced
330
, and Canada has done so. It has claimed that the Northwest Passage had been 
mapped and patrolled by Canadian explorers since the 19
th
 century, but has not demonstrated 
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other countries’ acquiescence.331 Canada now formally claims that the Northwest Passage is part 
of its internal waterways between a Canadian archipelago of thousands of islands, and has 
asserted sovereignty over all the waters within its Arctic archipelago
332
, over which it claims the 
authority to regulate pollution, control resource extraction, and potentially levy fees for ships 
passing through. The US is opposed to this view and argues that the Northwest Passage consists 
of international seas in which the right to transit and innocent passage should apply. 
 
The US, however, has been ‘agreeing to disagree’ with Canada on this issue333, and even wants 
Canada to exercise active jurisdiction in these seas due to security concerns
334
, so that the 
Canadian navy can intercept potential terrorist threats in the region
335
. Thus, there is only a latent 
conflict on this issue. The ‘acknowledged common ground’ for both states is compromise and 
the states recognize a need to find a working solution
336
. However, this is hard for both states, 
since the US is afraid to set a precedent by recognizing Canadian sovereignty over the 
waterways. Even a ‘special deal’ between the US and Canada could set a precedent for other 
countries to make a bilateral deal for control over the traffic in another international strait of 
strategic importance, such as cooperation by Iran and Oman to control the Strait of Hormuz
337
, or 
archipelagic states in Asia, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, claiming control over 
important waterways
338
. The US views this as an illustration of ‘creeping jurisdiction’339 and as a 
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restriction of the ‘freedom of the seas’340, and therefore as a threat to its interest, seeing as it has 
a large global naval capability. Similarly, the US has been the only state to take a position on and 
oppose Russia’s claim over waterways in the ‘Northern Sea Route’341/342. 
 
Even though the Northwest Passage has strategic significance for Canada, it has not thusfar 
turned away ships from the passage. It has, however, requested to be notified when a ship tries to 
do so, and there have been very few ships which have transited so far
343, so Canada’s 
commitment to its asserted sovereignty in this area has not been directly tested by any 
provocation recently. American ships have entered the Northwest Passage without Canadian 
permission several times, such as in 1969 and 1985, and may even do so without Canadian 
knowledge today, as is suspected of US submarines
344
. Thus, it seems like both sides are 
refraining from flaring up the dispute, thinking that this does not lead to gains for them. 
 
Russia supports Canada’s claim of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage, which does not 
benefit Russia directly in any way, but could be meant to prolong the divisiveness between 
Canada and the US on this issue, and is thus opportunistic and strategic. Other states have not 
protested Canada’s designation of the waters345, or made any significant remarks on the topic; 
thus, they do not feel that there is a need to ‘balance’ against Canada’s claim of power or against 
a joint Canadian-Russian viewpoint on the status of the waters. 
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Barents Sea 
Russia and Norway had a dispute over sovereignty in the Barents Sea, between the Norwegian 
Svalbard island and the Russian Novaya Zemlya island, since the 1960s. Negotiations during the 
1970s did not lead to a resolution, but the ‘Grey Zone Agreement’ was signed in 1978 to regulate 
fishing in the disputed area
346
. After 1982, when UNCLOS came into force, both states still 
argued for their own case; Norway argued that there were no ‘special circumstances’ in the 
overlapping claimed area and that the boundary should be the median line in accordance with the 
equidistance principle
347
, whilst Russia asserted that there are special circumstances, and wanted 
to apply the sector principle. 
 
In 2010, Russia and Norway unexpectedly reached a bilateral agreement on the division of the 
area, which divided the area approximately equally
348
. It was based on a compromise which 
according to Norway had the median line as a ‘point of departure’, but adjusting for the longer 
coastlines of Russia to give it a larger share
349
. The specific legal reasoning for the compromise 
is unspecified
350
, and it seems that non-legal (political) factors also played a large role
351
. The 
agreement included a promise to co-manage resources if these are found in the area
352
. Thus, it 
seems that these states have used their diplomatic freedom to achieve a pragmatic solution that is 
in both states’ interests, seeing as potentially lucrative resource extraction is helped by clear 
sovereign demarcations. 
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The agreement can also have wider political implications as a precedent, because Russia 
implicitly recognizes that Norway’s Svalbard island can generate an ‘outer continental shelf’ just 
as other islands do, irrespective of the earlier-mentioned special Svalbard treaty, although this is 
not formally asserted in the Barents Sea agreement
353
. It can also set a precedent for further 
bilateral treaties that determine sovereignty over an area extending beyond 200 nautical miles, 
and thus for a larger role of states (vis-à-vis institutions); a case of structural power. 
Analysis and conclusions 
In the Arctic, power relations between states are multifaceted, and the interesting findings shall 
be stated and concluded in this final section. 
Interests and intentions 
States’ interests in the Arctic are somewhat speculative because firmly focused on the future, 
since they want to assert sovereignty over areas so that they can profit from future economic 
opportunities and guard against future security threats. Interests are also shaped by the system-
level; for instance, control over natural resources in the Arctic is particularly important to Russia 
because this may solidify its position as an energy hegemon on a global scale. 
 
The realist objectives of sovereignty and security have during the ‘second Arctic wave’ in the 
2000s become more important in the Arctic, which is increasingly a place of ‘high politics’, 
because states’ sovereignty as a whole gained primacy over mere regional considerations. 
Borders have become more securitized and divisive, and military capacity and homeland security 
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are increasingly valued by states in the Arctic
354
. The realist objective of security is most 
important for the US, whose primary interest is freedom of the seas (shipping) and security 
against terrorist threats, and for Norway, which desires regional stability (especially with regard 
to Russia)
355
.  The objective of sovereignty is most important for Canada, conceives of the Arctic 
as a special ‘homeland’356. For Denmark and the three other Arctic Council member states 
(Finland, Iceland and Sweden), sovereignty and security are much less important. Russia focuses 
on economic potential (especially with regard to resources)
357
, which is also a realist objective. 
States attempt to demonstrate their commitment to the Arctic by rhetoric, policy priorities, and 
the demonstration of military capabilities. Rhetoric concerning the Arctic has been assertive, 
most so by Canada, but also by other states. This was caused by perceptions of the Arctic as a 
region to be conquered that led to attention-grabbing statements which were overblown
358
. States 
have asserted that they want to improve their capacities in the Arctic to secure their national 
interests vis-à-vis other states’ endeavours, and this implies that states want to engage in ‘internal 
balancing’ behaviour. However, the reality in the Arctic is much less confrontational. States do 
not have large actual military capacities in the Arctic, and the building of new materials has been 
hampered by financial constraints caused in part by the global economic crisis
359
. 
Distribution of power 
Power is shaped through structure in the Arctic, since states have to negotiate within a complex 
legal framework. The Arctic five states are upholding the UNCLOS institutional framework 
because they consider it in their mutual national interests that other stakeholders are excluded 
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from claims in the region, as was clearly expressed in the Ilulissat Declaration of 2007
360
, and in 
this way they exercise structural power. Because international law is often inconclusive and 
explicitly leaves room for states to make bilateral arrangements, however, states’ mutual power 
relations and diplomacy are still important.  
 
States power on a general level is non-fungible with respect to the Arctic and cannot simply be 
transferred to Arctic issues; hence, the Arctic distribution of power is different from the global 
distribution. The Arctic is generally considered a multipolar region, with no particular power 
among the ‘Arctic five’ clearly dominating over others and setting the rules361. However, among 
these powers, Russia is the most dominant and sometimes considered the regional ‘hegemon’, 
because it has the largest Arctic territory, population, and naval capability
362
. Canada comes next 
in terms of Arctic power, followed by the United States. The two smaller states, 
Denmark/Greenland and Norway, also have a fair influence because they have devoted sizable 
administrative capacity with good institutional efficiency to the Arctic, and because the 
UNCLOS procedure, which is adhered to by all Arctic five states, gives them sovereignty over 
sizable sea territories
363
. Arguably, the international distribution of benefits reflects the 
underlying distribution of power’364. 
Absence of conflict 
The offense-defence balance
365
 is in favour of defence due to the specific circumstances in the 
Arctic, making conflict less rewarding. The high security dangers and risks as well as economic 
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costs of conflict in the vulnerable and inaccessible Arctic environment do not weigh up against 
possible gains, and the extraction of resources requires the absence of conflict. Furthermore, 
open military confrontation would have many adverse political and diplomatic consequences for 
the states involved on the global system-level. The absence of military confrontation can thus be 
explained from the perspective of states’ rational cost-benefit analysis366. Whilst states want to 
protect themselves against concrete threats in the Arctic
367
, they do not have opportunities to 
maximize their power over other states, because territory in the Arctic cannot be permanently 
occupied or controlled directly. 
The ‘security dilemma’ is not so relevant in the Arctic because if one state gains operational 
capabilities in the region, this does not directly threaten other states. All the Arctic countries 
except Russia are members of NATO, and thus military allies, with a commitment not to attack 
one another. This institution generates trust and predictability and the member states by-and-
large know each other’s intentions have extensive knowledge of each other’s military affairs, and 
thus the ‘uncertainty about intentions’ is reduced. Although all states’ intentions and strategies 
are publicly expressed and fairly clear, there is sometimes confusion about Russia’s intentions in 
the perception of western analysts. This can lead to a more confrontational rhetoric than is 
necessary. 
 
Considerations of the system-level apply to the regional-level Arctic. Since global great powers 
are involved in the Arctic, which have many other mutual commitments and interests, engaging 
in conflict in the Arctic can damage diplomatic and institutional relations between the states 
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involved and have repercussions elsewhere; there are also no ‘proxy states’ through which these 
great powers could conflict in the Arctic. 
 
States are limited in their strategic options in the Arctic because of fears of creating precedents 
for other parts of the world, particularly because many sovereignty issues involve the Law of the 
Sea, which is applied globally; this is demonstrated in particular by the US attitude toward the 
Northwest Passage. Further developments in the Arctic will also depend on system-level factors, 
such as global shifts in great-power relations, changing geopolitical situations in other areas of 
maritime transit passage and resource extraction, rising oil and gas prices, accelerating climate 
change, etc.
368
. 
 
Balancing and strategic behaviour 
The smaller Arctic states pursue various strategies toward the dominant state, Russia. Norway 
engages in appeasement with Russia and attempts to steer clear of conflict, whilst Denmark 
engages in bandwagoning with the larger Arctic states by taking the initiative for extensive 
cooperation (just as marginal actors such as the EU attempt to bandwagon with Russia). The 
Nordic states attempt to balance externally by stressing cooperation within NATO as an explicit 
counterweight to Russian ambitions, and balance internally by reacting to Russian military arms 
build-up by reciprocating. These are cases of soft balancing, based on tacit agreements, and 
involving only limited arms build-up. 
There are fewer incentives for states to engage in hard balancing to achieve security in the 
Arctic, because the low likelihood of conflict makes ‘relative gains’ less relevant. There is no 
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arms race in the Arctic, and increased military capabilities do not necessarily lead to a security 
dilemma, but also to more cooperation between navies. On concrete disputes, ‘external 
balancing’ does not take place to a significant extent at all, because no clear alliances are formed 
in the Arctic; since multiple separate foreign policy dimensions are involved, and each state has 
different interests and hence different allies on each dimension, there is more of an ‘irregular 
patchwork of alliances’369, and most relations and disputes between states are actually 
bilateral
370
, rather than involving coalitions. 
Whilst states do not bargain based on their military capacities, they do consider these important 
and pay more and more attention to them in strategic policies. States are even attempting to 
maximize their own interests in the region beyond mere security issues and attempt to claim as 
much territory. This is rational for states given the high stakes involved, the geostrategically 
important location of the Arctic, and the large economic potential of the region. 
Sovereignty disputes 
Sovereignty disputes in the Arctic have until now been resolved through diplomatic means, both 
through legal and institutional arrangements, and through bilateral agreements. Longstanding 
sovereignty disputes are being resolved diplomatically only now that increased international 
attention is being paid to the Arctic, because this demands more clarity for states. However, 
situations can still change when the discovery of new islands leads to different demarcations 
under UNCLOS. 
 
                                                          
369
 Jensen and Rottem 2009, 81. 
370
 Ebinger and Zambetakis 2009, 1228. 
Skander Mabrouk A polar balance? Thesis research proposal 
65 
The sovereignty principles which states subscribe to are opportunistic and depend on what is in 
their own national interest. For instance, Russia and Norway are big proponents of the claiming 
of seabed authority on the basis of the continental shelf because they probably possess the most 
of this
371
. Canada supports the claim of sovereignty over ice as if it were land so that it can claim 
waterways within its archipelagos, whilst the United States takes the view that these are 
international waterways, because this is more in their trade interest. Canada and Russia have 
supported the ‘sector principle’ of dividing the Arctic along longitudinal lines, because this 
would give them a large share, whilst other states have opposed this
372
. 
 
States cooperate within institutions because this is in their national interest, but also because 
states gain international credibility by cooperating on security and environmental issues in the 
Arctic and can assert themselves as responsible powers in the international arena at large. 
Implications for further research 
This thesis has demonstrated that states use various strategies in the Arctic depending on what is 
in their national interest. These strategies and interests are constantly changing, so further 
research on the Arctic could focus on the development of the power dynamic between the NATO 
states and Russia in particular to see if patterns change when the power configuration changes on 
the system-level in the coming years. 
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